Secure History Preservation Through Timeline Entanglement by Maniatis, Petros & Baker, Mary
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
20
20
05
v1
  [
cs
.D
C]
  6
 Fe
b 2
00
2
Secure History Preservation Through
Timeline Entanglement
Petros Maniatis Mary Baker
Computer Science Department, Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305, USA
{maniatis,mgbaker}@cs.stanford.edu
http://identiscape.stanford.edu/
Abstract
A secure timeline is a tamper-evident historic record
of the states through which a system goes throughout
its operational history. Secure timelines can help us
reason about the temporal ordering of system states
in a provable manner. We extend secure timelines to
encompass multiple, mutually distrustful services, us-
ing timeline entanglement. Timeline entanglement as-
sociates disparate timelines maintained at independent
systems, by linking undeniably the past of one timeline
to the future of another. Timeline entanglement is a
sound method to map a time step in the history of one
service onto the timeline of another, and helps clients
of entangled services to get persistent temporal proofs
for services rendered that survive the demise or non-
cooperation of the originating service. In this paper we
present the design and implementation of Timeweave,
our service development framework for timeline entan-
glement based on two novel disk-based authenticated
data structures. We evaluate Timeweave’s performance
characteristics and show that it can be efficiently de-
ployed in a loosely-coupled distributed system of a few
hundred services with overhead of roughly 2-8% of the
processing resources of a PC-grade system.
1 Introduction
A large portion of the functionality offered by cur-
rent commercial “secure” or “trusted” on-line ser-
vices focuses on the here and now: certification au-
thorities certify that a public signature verification
key belongs to a named signer, secure file systems
vouch that the file with which they answer a lookup
query is the one originally stored, and trusted third
parties guarantee that they do whatever they are
trusted to do when they do it.
The concept of history has received consider-
ably less attention in systems and security research.
What did the certification authority certify a year
ago, and which file did the secure file system return
to a given query last week?
Interest in such questions is fueled by more than
just curiosity. Consider a scenario where Alice,
a certified accountant, consults confidential docu-
ments supplied by a business manager at client com-
pany Norne, Inc. so as to prepare a financial re-
port on behalf of the company for the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). If, in the future,
the SEC questions Alice’s integrity, accusing her of
having used old, obsolete financial information to
prepare her report, Alice might have to prove to
the SEC exactly what information she had received
from Norne, Inc. before preparing her report. To
do that, she would have to rely on authentic his-
toric data about documents and communication ex-
changes between herself and Norne, on the authen-
tic, relative and absolute timing of those exchanges,
perhaps even on the contents of the business agree-
ment between herself and the company at the time.
Especially if the company maliciously chooses to
tamper with or even erase its local records to repudi-
ate potential transgressions, Alice would be able to
redeem herself only by providing undeniable proof
that at the time in question, Norne, Inc. did in fact
present her with the documents it now denies.
Besides this basic problem, many other periph-
eral problems lurk: what if Norne, Inc. no longer
exists when Alice has to account for her actions?
What if Alice and the SEC belong to different trust
domains, i.e., have different certification authorities
or different secure time stamping services?
In this work we formulate the concept of secure
timelines based on traditional time stamping [11, 5]
and authenticated dictionaries [8, 10] (Section 3).
Secure timelines allow the maintenance of a persis-
tent, authenticated record of the sequence of states
that an accountable service takes during its lifetime.
Furthermore, we describe a technique called time-
2line entanglement for building a single, common
tamper-evident history for multiple mutually dis-
trustful entities (Section 4). First, timeline entan-
glement enables the temporal correlation of inde-
pendent histories, thereby yielding a single timeline
that encompasses events on independent systems.
This correlation can be verified independently in the
trust domain of each participant, albeit with some
loss of temporal resolution. Second, it allows clients
to preserve the provability of temporal relationships
among system states, even when the systems whose
states are in question no longer participate in the
collective, or are no longer in existence.
We then present Timeweave, our prototype
framework for the development of loosely-coupled
distributed systems of accountable services that
uses timeline entanglement to protect historic in-
tegrity (Section 5). We describe novel, scalable al-
gorithms to maintain secure timelines for extended
time periods and for very large data collections. Fi-
nally, we evaluate the performance characteristics of
Timeweave in Section 6 and show that it efficiently
supports large-sized groups of frequently entangled
services—up to several hundred—with maintenance
overhead that does not surpass 2-8% of the compu-
tational resources of a PC-grade server.
2 Background
In this work we draw on results from research on se-
cure time stamping and authenticated dictionaries.
The main inspiration behind our approach comes
from Lamport’s classic logical clock paradigm [14].
2.1 Secure Time Stamping
In secure time stamping, it is the responsibility of
a centralized, trusted third party, the Time Stamp-
ing Service (TSS), to maintain a temporal ordering
of submission among digital documents. As doc-
uments or document digests are submitted to it,
the TSS links them in a tamper-evident chain of
authenticators, using a one-way hash function, and
distributes portions of the chain and of the authenti-
cators to its clients. Given the last authenticator in
the chain it is impossible for anyone, including the
TSS, to insert a document previously unseen in the
middle of the chain unobserved, without significant
collusion, and without finding a second pre-image
for the hash function used [11].
Benaloh and de Mare [5] describe synchronous,
broadcast-based time stamping schemes where no
central TSS is required, and introduce the concept
of a time stamping round. All documents time
stamped during a round are organized in a data
structure, flat or hierarchical, and yield a collec-
tive digest that can be used to represent all the
documents of the entire round, in a tamper-evident
manner; given the digest, the existence of exactly
the documents inside the data structure can be
proved succinctly, and any document outside the
data structure can be proved not to be there.
Buldas et al. [8] extend previous work by signifi-
cantly diminishing the need to trust the TSS. They
also introduce efficient schemes for maintaining rela-
tive temporal orderings of digital artifacts with log-
arithmic complexity in the total number of artifacts.
A large, concurrent project towards the full speci-
fication of a time stamping service is described by
Quisquater et al. [21].
Ansper et al. [2] discuss time stamping service
availability, and suggest a scheme similar to consen-
sus in a replicated system to allow for fault-tolerant
time stamping.
2.2 Authenticated Dictionaries
Authenticated dictionaries are data structures that
operate as tamper-evident indices for a dynamic
data set. They help compute and maintain a one-
way digest of the data set, such that using this digest
and a succinct proof, the existence or non-existence
of any element in the set can be proved, without
considering the whole set.
The first such authenticated dictionary is consid-
ered to be an unanticipated use of Merkle’s hash
trees [17], a digital signature scheme. Hash trees
are binary trees in whose leaves the data set ele-
ments are placed. Each leaf node is labeled with
the hash of the contained data element and each
interior node is labeled with a hash of the concate-
nated labels of its children. The label of the root
node is a tamper-evident digest for the entire data
set. The existence proof for an element in the tree
consists of the necessary information to derive the
root hash from the element in question; specifically,
the proof consists of all labels and locations (left or
right) of all siblings of nodes on the path from the
element to the tree root.
Tree-based authenticated dictionaries reminiscent
of Merkle’s hash trees have been most notably used
for the distribution of certificate revocation records,
first by Kocher [13], and then in an incrementally
updatable version by Naor and Nissim [18]. Bul-
das et al. have obviated the need for trusting the
dictionary maintainer to keep the dictionary sorted,
by introducing the authenticated search tree [6, 7].
3Authenticated search trees are like hash trees, but
all nodes, leaves and internal nodes alike, contain
data set elements. The label of the node is a hash
not only of the labels of its children, but also of the
element of the node. Existence proofs contain node
elements in addition to nodes’ siblings’ labels on the
path from the element in question to the root. In
this manner, an existence proof follows the same
path that the tree maintainer must take to find a
sought element; as a result, clients need not uncon-
ditionally trust that the tree maintainer keeps the
tree sorted, since given a root hash, there is a unique
descent path that follows the standard traversal of
search trees towards any single element.
Authenticated dictionaries have also been pro-
posed based on different data structures. Buldas
et al. [8] describe several tree-like “binary linking
schemes.” Goodrich et al. [10] propose an authenti-
cated skip list that relies on commutative hashing.
In the recent literature, the maintenance of au-
thenticated but persistent dynamic sets [9, p. 294]
has received some attention. Persistent dynamic
sets allow modifications of the elements in the
set, but maintain enough information to recreate
any prior version of the set. Anagnostopoulos et
al. [1] propose and implement persistent authenti-
cated skip lists, where not only older versions of the
skip list are available, but they are each, by them-
selves, an authenticated dictionary. In the same
work, and also in work by Maniatis and Baker [16],
persistent authenticated dictionaries based on red-
black trees are sketched in some detail, although the
resulting designs are different. Specifically, in the
former work, although multiple versions of the au-
thenticated red-black tree are maintained, the col-
lection of versions is itself not authenticated; the
latter work uses a second, non-persistent authenti-
cated dictionary to authenticate the tree versions.
3 Secure Timelines
We define a secure timeline within a service domain.
A service domain comprises a system offering a par-
ticular service—the service of the domain—and a
set of clients who use that system for that service—
the clients of the domain. Such a service domain
could be, for example, the file server and all clients
of a secure file system, or an enterprise-wide certi-
fication authority along with all certificate subjects
within that enterprise.
Within the context of a service domain, a secure
timeline is a tamper-evident, temporally-ordered,
append-only sequence of the states taken by the ser-
vice of that domain. In a sense, a secure timeline
defines an authenticated logical clock for the service.
Each time step of the clock is annotated with the
state in which the service is at the time, and an au-
thenticator. The authenticator is tamper-evident:
given the authenticator of the latest time step of
the timeline, it is intractable for the service or for
any other polynomially-bound party to “change his-
tory” unobtrusively by altering the annotations or
authenticators of past time steps.
In this work, we consider secure timelines based
on one-way (second pre-image-resistant) hash func-
tions. Assuming, as is common, that one-way hash
functions exist, we use such functions to define the
“arrow of time.” In other words, given a presum-
ably one-way hash function h such as SHA-1 [19], if
b = h(a), then we conclude that value a was known
before value b, or a precedes b, since given b the
probability of guessing the right a is negligible.
A simple recursive way to define a secure time-
line is as follows: if at logical time i the clock has
authenticator Ti, then at the next logical time step
i + 1, the hash function h is applied to the previ-
ous clock authenticator Ti and to the current state
of the system Si. Assuming that f is a one-way
digest function from system states to digests, then
Ti+1 = h(i‖Ti‖f(Si)), where ‖ denotes concatena-
tion. Given Ti+1, it is intractable to produce ap-
propriate α such that Ti+1 = h(i‖Ti
′‖α), so as to
make an arbitrary authenticator Ti
′ 6= Ti appear
as the timeline authenticator of logical step i, from
the second pre-image resistance of the hash func-
tion. Similarly, for a given Ti+1 only a unique state
digest di = f(Si) is probable, and, from the one-
way property of the state digest function f , only a
unique system state Si is probable. Therefore, au-
thenticator Ti+1 is, in a sense, a one-way digest of
all preceding authenticators and system states, as
well as of their total temporal ordering.
Many existing accountable services match the se-
cure timeline paradigm, since secure timelines are
a generalization of secure time stamping services
(TSS) [11]. The service state of a TSS is an au-
thenticated dictionary of all document digests sub-
mitted to it during a time stamping round. The Key
Archival Service (KAS) by Maniatis and Baker [16]
is another service with a timeline, where the service
state is now a persistent authenticated dictionary
of all certificates and revocation records issued by a
Certification Authority. Similarly, any service that
maintains one-way digests of its current state can
be retrofitted to have a secure timeline. Consider,
for example, Kocher’s Certificate Revocation Trees
(CRT) [13]. The state of the service at the end of
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Figure 1: The first few steps of a secure timeline. Time
flows from left to right. Note that the current authen-
ticator of the timeline is an input to the next state of
the system. We explain one way to accomplish this in
Section 5.2.
each publication interval consists of a hash-tree of
all published revocation records. The root hash of
the CRT is a one-way digest of the database. Conse-
quently, a secure timeline for the revocation service
can easily follow from the above construction.
Figure 1 illustrates the first few time steps of a
secure timeline. In the figure, the new timeline
authenticator is also fed into the new state of the
system. Depending on the definition of the state
digest function, a new state of the service can be
shown to be fresh, i.e., to have followed the com-
putation of the authenticator for the previous time
step. In Time Stamping Services, this places the
time stamp of a document between two rounds of
the service. In the Key Archival Service, this bounds
the time interval during which a change in the Cer-
tification Authority (new certificate, revocation, or
refresh) has occurred. In a CRT timeline system,
this bounds the time when a revocation database
was built. Some authenticated dictionaries can be
shown to be fresh(e.g., [8]), and we explain how we
handle freshness in Section 5.2.
Secure timelines can be used to answer two basic
kinds of questions: existence questions and temporal
precedence questions. Existence questions are of the
form “is S the i-th system state?” Existence ques-
tions can be used to establish that the service exhib-
ited a certain kind of behavior at a particular phase
in its history. In the time stamping example, an
existence question could be “is d the round hash at
time i?” A positive answer allows a client to verify
the validity of a time stamp from round i, since time
stamps from round i are authenticated with the root
hash of that round. Temporal precedence questions
are of the form “did state S occur before state S′?”.
In time stamping, answers to precedence questions
can establish precedence between two time stamped
documents.
Answers to both existence and temporal prece-
dence questions are provable. Given the last au-
thenticator in the timeline, to prove the existence
of a state in the timeline’s past I have to produce
a one-way path—a sequence of applications of one-
way functions—from that state to the current time-
line authenticator. Similarly, to prove that state S
precedes state S′, I have to show that there exists a
one-way path from state S to state S′, which means
that the former must precede the latter. For ex-
ample, in Figure 1, the path from S0 to T1 to S2
is one-way and establishes that state S0 occurred
before S2. Extending this path to T3 provides an
existence proof for state S0, if the verifier knows
that T3 is the latest timeline authenticator.
Secure timelines are a general mechanism for tem-
poral authentication. As with any other authentica-
tion mechanism, timeline proofs are useful only if
the authenticator against which they are validated
is itself secure and easily accessible to all verifiers,
i.e., the clients within the service domain. In other
words, clients must be able to receive securely au-
thenticator tuples of the form 〈i, Ti〉 from the ser-
vice at every time step, or at coarser intervals. This
assumes that clients have a means to open authen-
ticated channels to the service. Furthermore, there
must be a unique tuple for every time step i. Ei-
ther the service must be trusted by the clients to
maintain a unique timeline, or the timeline must
be periodically “anchored” on an unconditionally
trusted write-once publication medium, such as a
paper journal or popular newspaper. The latter
technique is used by some commercial time stamp-
ing services [24], to reduce the clients’ need to trust
the service.
For the remainder of this paper, “time i” means
the state of the service that is current right after
timeline element i has been published, as well as
the physical time period until the publication of the
timeline authenticators for time step i+ 1. For ser-
vice A, we denote time i as 〈A, i〉. Furthermore, we
denote the i-th timeline authenticator of service A
as TAi and the precedence proof from A’s time i to
j as PA,jA,i , when multiple services are discussed.
4 Timeline Entanglement
In the previous section, we described how a secure
timeline can be used by the clients within a service
domain to reason about the temporal ordering of
5the states of the service in a provable manner. In
so doing, the clients of the service have access to
tamper-proof historic information about the opera-
tion of the service in the past.
However, the timeline of service A does not carry
much conviction before a client who belongs to a dif-
ferent, disjoint service domain B, i.e., a client who
does not trust service A or the means by which it is
held accountable. Consider an example from time
stamping where Alice, a client of TSS A, wishes to
know when Bob, a client of another TSS B, time
stamped a particular document D. A time stamp-
ing proof that links D to an authenticator in B’s
timeline is not convincing to Alice, since she has no
way to compare temporally time steps in B’s time-
line to her own timeline, held by A.
This is the void that timeline entanglement fills.
Timeline entanglement creates a provable temporal
precedence from a time step in a secure timeline to
a time step in another independent timeline. Its
objective is to allow a group of mutually distrustful
service domains to collaborate towards maintaining
a common, tamper-proof history of their collective
timelines that can be verified from the point of view
(i.e., within the trust domain) of any one of the
participants.
In timeline entanglement, each participating ser-
vice domain maintains its own secure timeline, but
also keeps track of the timelines of other partici-
pants, by incorporating authenticators from those
foreign timelines into its own service state, and
therefore its own timeline. In a sense, all partici-
pants enforce the commitment of the timeline au-
thenticators of their peers.
In Section 4.1, we define timeline entanglement
with illustrative examples and outline its properties.
We then explore in detail three aspects of timeline
entanglement: Secure Temporal Mappings in Sec-
tion 4.2, the implications of dishonest timeline main-
tainers in Section 4.3, and Historic Survivability in
Section 4.4.
4.1 Fundamentals
Timeline entanglement is defined within the context
of an entangled service set. This is a dynamically
changing set of service domains. Although an entan-
gled service set where all participating domains offer
the same kind of service is conceivable—such as, for
example, a set of time stamping services—we envi-
sion many different service types, time stamping ser-
vices, certification authorities, historic records ser-
vices, etc., participating in the same entangled set.
We assume that all participating services know the
current membership of the entangled service set, al-
though inconsistencies in this knowledge among ser-
vices does not hurt the security of our constructs
below. We also assume that members of the service
set can identify and authenticate each other, either
through the use of a common public key infrastruc-
ture, or through direct out-of-band key exchanges.
Every participating service defines an indepen-
dent sampling method to select a relatively small
subset of its logical time steps for entanglement.
For example, a participant can choose to entangle
every n-th time step, although other sampling meth-
ods are certainly not precluded. At every time step
picked for entanglement, the participant sends an
authenticated message that contains its signed logi-
cal time and timeline authenticator to all other par-
ticipants in the entangled service set. This message
is called a timeline thread. A timeline thread sent
from A at time 〈A, i〉 is denoted as tAi and has the
form [A, i, TAi , σA{A, i, T
A
i }]. σA{X} represents A’s
signature on message X .
When participant B receives a correctly signed
timeline thread from participant A, it verifies the
consistency of that thread with its local view of
collective history and then archives it. Thread tAi
is consistent with B’s local view of collective his-
tory if it can be proved to be on the same one-way
path (hash chain) as the last timeline authenticator
of A that B knows about (see Figure 2). Towards
this goal, A includes the necessary temporal prece-
dence proof, as described in Section 3, along with
the thread that it sends to B. In the figure, when
thread tAi reaches B, the most recent timeline au-
thenticator of A thatB knows is TAl . Along with the
thread, A sends the precedence proof PA,iA,l from its
time 〈A, l〉 to time 〈A, i〉. As a result, B can verify
that the new thread carries a “legitimate” timeline
authenticator from A, one consistent with history.
If everything checks out, B archives the new time-
line authenticator and associated precedence proof
in its local thread archive.
A thread archive serves two purposes: first, it
maintains a participant’s local knowledge of the his-
tory of the entangled service set. Specifically, it
archives proof that every participant it knows about
maintains a consistent timeline. It accomplishes
this by simply storing the threads, which are snap-
shots in the sender’s timeline, and supporting prece-
dence proofs, which connect these snapshots in a
single one-way chain. The second purpose of the
thread archive is to maintain temporal precedence
proofs between every foreign thread it receives and
local timeline steps. It accomplishes this by con-
structing a one-way digest of its contents, which is
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Figure 2: Entanglement exchanges between partici-
pants A and B. The workings of B are shown in detail.
We show two entanglement exchanges, one of time 〈B, k〉
with time 〈A, l〉, and one of time 〈A, i〉 with time 〈B, j〉.
Thick black horizontal arrows show timeline thread mes-
sages. Thin black horizontal arrows show entanglement
receipt messages. Vertical black arrows show one-way
operations. The thick shadowed arrow shows the tem-
poral ordering effected by thread tAi and its receipt r
B,j
A,i .
then used along with the system state digest, to de-
rive the next local timeline authenticator; the mod-
ified recursive definition of timeline authenticators
is TAi+1 = h(i‖T
A
i ‖h(f(S
A
i )‖g(E
A
i ))), where g is the
one-way digest function for the thread archive, and
EAi is the current version of the thread archive at
time 〈A, i〉. See Section 5.2 for details on a data
structure capable of fulfilling these requirements.
Participant B responds to the newly reported
timeline authenticator with an entanglement receipt.
This receipt proves that the next timeline authen-
ticator that B produces is influenced partly by the
archiving of the thread it just received. The re-
ceipt must convince A of three things: first, that its
thread was archived; second, that the thread was
archived in the latest—“freshest”—version of B’s
thread archive; and, third, that this version of the
thread archive is the one whose digest is used to
derive the next timeline authenticator that B pro-
duces. As a result, the entanglement receipt rB,jA,i
that B returns to A for the entanglement of thread
tAi consists of three components: first, a precedence
proof PB,j−1B,k from the last of B’s timeline authen-
ticators that A knows about, TBk , to B’s timeline
authenticator right before archiving A’s new thread
TBj−1; second, an existence proof for the timeline
thread tAi in the latest version E
B
j−1 of B’s thread
archive, as modified after time 〈B, j−1〉 (the equiv-
alent of an undeniable attester in [7]—see also Sec-
tion 5.2); and, third, a one-way derivation of the
next timeline authenticator of B from the new ver-
sion of the thread archive, i.e., the one-way digest
f(SBj−1) of the current system state. It is now A’s
turn to check the validity of the proofs in the en-
tanglement receipt. If all goes well, A stores the
proof of precedence and reported timeline authenti-
cator from B in its receipt archive. This concludes
the entanglement process from time 〈A, i〉 to time
〈B, j〉.
The receipt archive is similar to the thread
archive; it stores entanglement receipts that the
participant receives in response to its own time-
line threads. However, it is not an authenticated
archive, since it is not necessary to prove to anyone
whether and when a participant stores the receipts
received in response to its own timeline threads.
After the entanglement of time 〈A, i〉 with time
〈B, j〉, both A and B have in their possession
portable temporal precedence proofs ordering A’s
past before B’s future. Any one-way process at A
whose result is included in the derivation of TAi or
earlier timeline authenticators at A can be shown
to have completed before any one-way process at
B that includes in its inputs TBj or later timeline
authenticators at B.
In this definition of timeline entanglement, a par-
ticipating service entangles its timeline at the prede-
termined sample time steps with all other services
in the entangled service set (we call this all-to-all
entanglement). In this work we limit the discus-
sion to all-to-all entanglement only, but we describe
a more restricted, and consequently less expensive,
entanglement model in future work (Section 7).
The primary benefit of timeline entanglement is
its support for secure temporal mapping. A client
in one service domain can use temporal information
maintained in a remote service domain that he does
not trust, by mapping that information onto his own
service domain. This mapping results in some loss
of temporal resolution—for example, a time instant
maps to a positive-length time interval. We describe
secure temporal mapping in Section 4.2.
Timeline entanglement is a sound method of ex-
panding temporal precedence proofs outside a ser-
7vice domain; it does not prove incorrect prece-
dences. However it is not complete, that is, there
are some precedences it cannot prove. For exam-
ple, it is possible for a dishonest service to maintain
clandestinely two timelines, essentially “hiding” the
commitment of some of its system states from some
members of the entangled service set. We explore
the implications of such behavior in Section 4.3.
Finally, we consider the survivability characteris-
tics of temporal proofs beyond the lifetime of the
associated timeline, in Section 4.4.
4.2 Secure Temporal Mapping
Temporal mapping allows a participating service A
to map onto its own timeline a time step 〈B, i〉 from
the timeline of another participantB. This mapping
is denoted by 〈B, i〉 7→ A. Since A and B do not
trust each other, the mapping must be secure; this
means it should be practically impossible for B to
prove to A that (〈B, i〉 7→ A) = [〈A, j〉, 〈A, k〉], if
〈B, i〉 occurred before 〈A, j〉 or after 〈A, i〉.
Figure 3 illustrates the secure temporal mapping
〈B, 2〉 7→ A. To compute the mapping, A requires
only local information from its thread and receipt
archives. First, it searches in its receipt archive for
the latest entanglement receipt that B sent back
before or at time 〈B, 2〉, receipt rB,1A,1 in the example.
As described in Section 4, this receipt proves to A
that its time 〈A, 1〉 occurred before B’s time 〈B, 1〉.
Then, A searches in its thread archive for the
earliest thread that B sent it after or at time
〈B, 2〉, which is thread tB3 in the example. This
thread proves to A that its time 〈A, 5〉 occurred
after time 〈B, 3〉. Recall, also, that when A re-
ceived tB3 in the first place, it had also received
a temporal precedence proof from 〈B, 1〉 to 〈B, 3〉,
which in the straightforward hash chain case, also
includes the system state digest for 〈B, 2〉. Now A
has enough information to conclude that (〈B, 2〉 7→
A) = [〈A, 1〉, 〈A, 5〉].
Since A has no reason to believe that B maintains
its timeline in regular intervals, there is no more
that A can assume about the temporal placement
of state SB2 within the interval [〈A, 1〉, 〈A, 5〉]. This
results in a loss of temporal resolution; in the figure,
this loss is illustrated as the difference between the
length on B’s timeline from 〈B, 2〉 to 〈B, 3〉 (i.e., the
“duration” of time step 〈B, 2〉) and the length of the
segment on A’s timeline from 〈A, 1〉 to 〈A, 5〉 (the
duration of 〈B, 2〉 7→ A). This loss is proportional
to the interval between successive thread messages
between A and B. It can be made shorter, but only
at the cost of increasing the frequency with which A
Bt3
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Figure 3: Secure mapping of time 〈B, 2〉 onto the time-
line of A. Thick arrows indicate timeline threads. Thin
arrows indicate entanglement receipts (only the relevant
entanglement receipts are shown). Irrelevant thread and
receipt messages are grayed-out. The dark broken line
illustrates the progression of values that secure the cor-
rectness of the mapping.
and B send threads to each other, which translates
to more messages and more computation at A and
B. We explore this trade-off in Section 6.
Secure time mapping allows clients within a ser-
vice domain to determine with certainty the tem-
poral ordering between states on their own service
and on remote, untrusted service domains. Going
back to the time stamping example, assume that
Alice has in her possession a time stamp for docu-
ment C in her own service domain A, which links it
to local time 〈A, 0〉, and she has been presented by
Bob with a time stamp on document D in Bob’s ser-
vice domain B, which links Bob’s document to time
〈B, 2〉. Alice can request from A the time mapping
〈B, j〉 7→ A, shown above to be [〈A, 1〉, 〈A, 5〉]. With
this information, Alice can be convinced that her
document C was time stamped before Bob’s doc-
ument D was, regardless of whether or not Alice
trusts Bob or B.
In the general case, not all time steps in one time-
line map readily to another timeline. To reduce the
length of temporal precedence proofs, we use hash
skip lists (Section 5.1) instead of straightforward
hash chains in Timeweave, our prototype. Tempo-
ral precedence proofs on skip lists are shorter be-
cause they do not contain every timeline authenti-
cator from the source to the destination. In time-
lines implemented in this manner, only time steps
included in the skip list proof can be mapped with-
out the cooperation of the remote service. For other
mappings, the remote service must supply addi-
tional, more detailed precedence proofs, connecting
the time authenticator in question to the time au-
thenticators that the requester knows about.
84.3 Historic Integrity
Timeline entanglement is intended as an artificial
enlargement of the class of usable, temporal order-
ings that clients within a service domain can deter-
mine undeniably. Without entanglement, a client
can determine the provable ordering of events only
on the local timeline. With entanglement, one-way
paths are created that anchor time segments from
remote, untrusted timelines onto the local timeline.
However, the one-way properties of the digest and
hash functions used make timelines secure only as
long as everybody is referring to the same, single
timeline. If, instead, a dishonest serviceAmaintains
clandestinely two or more timelines or branches of
the same timeline, publishing different timeline au-
thenticators to different subsets of its users, then
that service can, in a sense, revise history. Just [12]
identified such an attack against early time stamp-
ing services. Within a service domain, this attack
can be foiled by enforcing that the service period-
ically commits its timeline on a write-once, widely
published medium, such as a local newspaper or pa-
per journal. In such a way, when there is doubt, a
local client can always request a precedence proof
that links the current timeline authenticator to the
most recent widely published authenticator.
Unfortunately, a similar attack can be mounted
against the integrity of collective history, in an en-
tangled service set. Entanglement, as described in
Section 4, does not verify that samples from B’s
timeline that are archived at A and C are identi-
cal. If B is malicious, it can report authenticators
from one chain to A and from another to C, unde-
tected (see Figure 4). In the general case, this does
not dilute the usability of entanglement among hon-
est service domains. Instead, it renders unprovable
some interactions between honest and dishonest ser-
vice domains. More importantly, attacks by a ser-
vice against the integrity of its own timeline can
only make external temporal precedence informa-
tion involving that timeline inconclusive; such at-
tacks cannot change the temporal ordering between
time steps on honest and dishonest timelines. Ulti-
mately, it is solely the clients of a dishonest service
who suffer the consequences.
Consider, for instance, the scenario of Figure 4.
Dishonest service B has branched off its originally
unique timeline into two separate timelines at its
time 〈B, 2〉. It uses the top branch, with times 3′,
4′, etc., in its entanglements with service C, and its
bottom branch, with times 3, 4, etc., in its entangle-
ments with service A. From A’s point of view, event
N is incorporated in B’s state and corresponding
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Figure 4: An example showing a dishonest service B
that maintains two timelines, entangling one with A and
another with C. Event N is committed on the bottom
branch of B’s timeline, but does not appear on the top
branch.
timeline at time 〈B, 3〉. From C’s point of view,
however, event N seems never to have happened.
Since N does not appear in the branch of B’s time-
line that is visible to C, C’s clients cannot conclu-
sively place event N in time at all. Therefore, it is
only the client of B who is responsible for event N
who suffers from this discrepancy. C does not know
about it at all, and A knows its correct relative tem-
poral position.
We describe briefly a method for enforcing time-
line uniqueness within an entangled service set in
Section 7.
4.4 Historic Survivability
Historic survivability in the context of an entangled
set of services is the decoupling of the verifiability
of existence and temporal precedence proofs within
a timeline from the fate of the maintainer of that
timeline.
Temporal proofs are inherently survivable be-
cause of their dependence on well-known, one-way
constructs. For example, a hash chain consisting
of multiple applications of SHA-1 certainly proves
that the result of the chain temporally followed the
input to the chain. However, this survivability is
moot, if the timeline authenticators that the proof
orders undeniably can no longer be interpreted, or
associated with a real time frame.
Fortunately, secure temporal mapping allows a
client within a service domain to fortify a tempo-
ral proof that he cares about against the passing
of the local service. The client can accomplish this
by participating in more service domains than one;
then, he can proactively map the temporal proofs
9he cares about from their source timeline onto all
the timelines of the service domains in which he be-
longs. In this manner, even if all but one of the
services he is associated with become unavailable or
go out of business, the client may still associate his
proofs with a live timeline in the surviving service
domain.
Consider, for example, the scenario illustrated in
Figure 5. David, who belongs to all three service do-
mains A, B and C, wishes to fortify event N so as
to be able to place it in time, even if service B is no
longer available. He maps the event onto the time-
lines of A and C—“mapping an event N” is equiv-
alent to mapping the timeline time step in whose
system state event N is included, that is, 〈B, 2〉 in
the example. Even though the event occurred in B’s
timeline, David can still reason about its relative po-
sition in time, albeit with some loss of resolution, in
both the service domains of A and C, long after B
is gone. In a sense, David “hedges his bets” among
multiple services, hoping that one of them survives.
The use of temporal mapping in this context is sim-
ilar in scope to the techniques used by Ansper et
al. [2] for fault-tolerant time stamping services, al-
though it assumes far less mutual trust among the
different service domains.
5 Implementation
We have devised two new, to our knowledge, disk-
oriented data structures for the implementation of
Timeweave, our timeline entanglement prototype.
In Section 5.1, we present authenticated append-
only skip lists. These are an efficient optimization of
traditional hash chains and yield precedence proofs
with size proportional to the square logarithm of
the total elements in the list, as opposed to linear.
In Section 5.2, we present RBB-Trees, our disk-
based, persistent authenticated dictionaries based
on authenticated search trees. RBB-Trees scale to
larger sizes than current in-memory persistent au-
thenticated dictionaries, while making efficient use
of the disk. Finally, in Section 5.3, we outline how
Timeweave operates.
5.1 Authenticated Append-only Skip
Lists
Our basic tool for maintaining an efficient secure
timeline is the authenticated append-only skip list.
The authenticated append-only skip list is a mod-
ification of the simplistic hash chain described in
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Figure 5: An example of mapping event N onto two
other timelines, to obtain a survivable proof of its tem-
poral position. The top shaded line represents (N 7→ A)
and the bottom shaded line represents (N 7→ C).
Section 3 that yields improved access characteris-
tics and shorter proofs.
Our skip lists are deterministic, as opposed to the
randomization used in most skip lists proposed in
the literature [20]. Unlike the authenticated skip
lists introduced by Goodrich et al. [10], our skip lists
are append-only, which obviates the need for com-
mutative hashing. Every list element has a numeric
identifier that is a counter from the first element
of the list (the first element is element 1, the tenth
element is element 10, and so on). Every element
carries a data value and an authenticator, similarly
to what was suggested in Section 3 for single-chain
timelines.
The skip list consists of multiple parallel hash
chains at different levels of detail, each containing
half as many elements as the previous one. The ba-
sic chain (at level 0 ) links every element to the au-
thenticator of the one before it, just like simple hash
chains. The next chain (at level 1) coexists with
the level 0 chain, but only contains elements whose
numeric identifiers are multiples of 2, and every el-
ement is linked to the element two positions before
it. Similarly, only elements with numeric identifiers
that are multiples of 2i are contained in the hash
chain of level i. No chains of level j that is higher
than log2 n are maintained, if all elements are n.
The authenticator Ti of element i with data value
di is computed from a hash of all the partial au-
thenticators (called links) in each basic hash chain
in which it participates—we share the notation from
Section 3 for data values and authenticators here.
Element i participates in l+1 chains, where i = 2lk,
and 2 does not divide k (in other words, l is the
exponent of 2 in the factorization of i), therefore
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Figure 6: Six consecutive skip list elements, element 16
to element 21. Arrows show hash operations from pre-
vious authenticators to links of an element. The top of
each tower is the resulting authenticator for the element,
derived by hashing together all links underneath it.
element i has the l + 1 links Lji = h(i, j, di, Ti−2j ),
0 ≤ j ≤ l, and authenticator Ti = h(L0i ‖ . . . ‖L
l
i).
Figure 6 illustrates a portion of such a skip list. In
the implementation, we combine together the ele-
ment authenticator with the 0-th level link for odd-
numbered elements, since such elements have a sin-
gle link, which is sufficient as an authenticator by
itself.
Skip lists allow their efficient traversal from an
element i to a later element j in a logarithmic num-
ber of steps: starting from element i, successively
higher-level links are utilized until the “tallest ele-
ment” (one with the largest power of 2 in its fac-
tors among all element indices between i and j) is
reached. Thereafter, successively lower-level links
are traversed until j is reached. More specifically,
an iterative process starts with the current element
c = i. To move closer to the destination element
with index j, the highest power 2l of 2 that divides
c is picked, such that c + 2z ≤ j. Then element
k = c + 2z becomes the next current element c in
the traversal. The iteration stops when c = j.
The associated temporal precedence proof linking
element i before element j is constructed in a man-
ner similar to the traversal described above. At ev-
ery step, when a jump of length 2z is taken from the
current element c to k = c+2z, the element value of
the new element dk is appended to the proof, along
with all the associated links of element k, except for
the link at level z. Link Lzk is omitted since it can
be computed during verification from the previous
authenticator Tc and the new value dk.
In the example of Figure 6, the path from el-
ement 17 to element 21 traverses elements 18
and 20. The corresponding precedence proof
from element 17 to element 21 is P 2117 =
{d18, L118; d20, L
0
20, L
2
20; d21}. With this proof and
given the authenticators T17 and T21 of elements
17 and 21 respectively, the verifier can succes-
sively compute T ′18 = h(h(18‖0‖d18‖T17)‖L
1
18)),
then T ′20 = h(L
0
20‖h(20‖1‖d20‖T
′
18‖L
2
20)) and finally
T ′21 = h(21‖0‖d21‖T
′
20)—recall that for all odd ele-
ments i, Ti = L
0
i . If the known and the derived
values for the authenticator agree (T21 = T
′
21), then
the verifier can be convinced that the authentica-
tor T17 preceded the computation of authenticator
T21, which is the objective of a precedence proof,
as long as the verifier believes that finding a sec-
ond pre-image for the hash function h has negligible
probability.
Thanks to the properties of skip lists, the length
of any of these proofs contains roughly a logarith-
mic number of authenticators, links and values in
the total number of elements in the timeline. The
worst-case proof for a skip list of n elements tra-
verses 2 × log2(n) elements, climbing links of every
level between 0 and log2(n) and back down again, or
log22(n) link values total. Assuming that every link
and value is a SHA-1 digest of 160 bits, the worst
case proof for a timeline of a billion elements is no
longer than 20 KBytes, and most are much shorter.
Our skip lists are fit for secondary storage. They
are implemented on memory-mapped files. Since
modifications are expected to be relatively rare,
compared to searches and proof extractions, we al-
ways write changes to the skip list through to the
disk immediately after they are made, to maintain
consistency in the face of machine crashes. We do
not, however, support structural recovery from disk
crashes; we believe that existing file system and re-
dundant disk array technologies are adequate to pre-
vent and recover all but the most catastrophic losses
of disk bits.
5.2 Disk-based Persistent Authenti-
cated Dictionaries
This work uses authenticated persistent dictionaries
based on trees. A persistent dictionary maintains
multiple versions (or snapshots) of its contents as
it is modified. In addition to the functionality of-
fered by simple authenticated dictionaries, it can
also provably answer questions of the form “in snap-
shot t, was element d in the dictionary?”. Further-
more, the authenticated labels for every individual
snapshot must also be maintained.
The dictionaries we used in this work can poten-
tially grow very large, much larger than the sizes
of current main memories. Therefore, we have ex-
tended our earlier work on balanced persistent au-
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Figure 7: An RBB-Tree. Boxes are disk blocks. In this
example, each non-root disk block contains a minimum
of 1 and a maximum of 3 keys. The authentication labels
of the embedded binary tree nodes are not shown; for
any key node, its label consists of the hash of the label of
its left child, its own key, and the label of its right child,
as in [6, 7]. Furthermore, we do not show the “color”
attribute of the keys in the per-node Red-Black trees,
since they have no bearing in our discussion.
thenticated search trees [16] to design on-disk per-
sistent authenticated dictionaries. The resulting
data structure, the RBB-Tree, is a binary authen-
ticated search tree [6, 7] embedded in a persistent
B-Tree [4][9, Ch. 18]. Figure 7 shows a simple RBB-
Tree holding 16 numeric keys.
RBB-Trees, like B-Trees, are designed to organize
keys together in efficient structures that result in few
disk accesses per tree operation. Every tree node is
stored in its own disk block, contains a minimum of
r−1 and a maximum of 2r−1 keys, and has between
r and 2r children (the root node is only required to
have between 1 and 2r − 1 keys).
Unlike traditional B-Trees, RBB-Tree nodes do
not store their keys in a flat array. Instead, keys
within RBB nodes are organized in a balanced bi-
nary tree, specifically a Red-Black tree [3][9, Ch.
13]. We consider RBB-Trees “virtual” binary trees,
since the in-node binary trees connected to each
other result in a large, piecewise Red-Black tree,
encompassing all keys in the entire dictionary.
It is this “virtual” binary tree of keys that is au-
thenticated, in the sense of the authenticated search
trees by Buldas et al. [6, 7]. As such, the security
properties of RBB-Trees are identical to those of au-
thenticated search trees, including the structure of
existence/non-existence proofs.
Since the RBB-Tree is a valid B-Tree, it is effi-
cient in the number of disk block accesses it requires
for the basic tree operations of insertion, deletion
and modification. Specifically, each of those oper-
ations takes O(logrn) disk accesses, where n is the
total number of keys in the tree. Similarly, since
the internal binary tree in each RBB-Tree node is
balanced, the virtual embedded binary tree is also
loosely balanced, and has height O((logrn)(log2r)),
that is, O(log2n) but with a higher constant factor
than in a real Red-Black tree. These two collabo-
rating types of balancing applied to the virtual bi-
nary tree—the first through the blocking of keys in
RBB nodes, and the second through the balancing
of the key nodes inside each RBB node—help keep
the length of the resulting existence/non-existence
proofs also bounded to O(log2n) elements.
The internal key structure imposed on RBB-Tree
nodes does not improve the speed of search through
the tree over the speed of search in an equivalent
B-Tree, but limits the length of existence proofs
immensely. The existence proof for a datum in-
side an authenticated search tree consists of the
search keys of each node from the sought datum
up to the root, along with the labels of the siblings
of each of the ancestors of the sought datum up
to the root. In a very “bushy” tree, as B-Trees
are designed to be, this would mean proofs con-
taining authentication data from a small number
of individual nodes; unfortunately, each individual
node’s authentication data consist of roughly r keys
and r siblings’ labels. For example, a straightfor-
wardly implemented authenticated B-Tree storing
a billion SHA-1 digests with r = 100 yields exis-
tence proofs of length ⌈logr10
9⌉ × (r× (160 + 160))
bits, or roughly 160 KBits. The equivalent Red-
Black tree yields existence proofs of no more than
2×⌈log210
9⌉× (160+ 160) bits, or about 18 KBits.
RBB-Trees seek to trade off the low disk access costs
of B-Trees with the short proof lengths of Red-Black
trees. The equivalent RBB-Tree of one billion SHA-
1 digests yields proofs no longer than
B−Tree height
︷ ︸︸ ︷
⌈logr10
9⌉ ×
max RB−Tree height
︷ ︸︸ ︷
2× ⌈log2r⌉ ×
key+label
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(160 + 160)
bits or roughly 22 KBits, with disk access costs iden-
tical to those of the equivalent B-Tree.
We have designed dynamic set persistence [9, p.
294] at the granularity of both the RBB-Node and
the embedded key node (see Figure 8). Each RBB
node allows a small number of persistent versions of
itself. When all the available version slots or all the
available key slots of the RBB-node are exhausted,
a new one is created, containing only the latest key
tree snapshot.
The different persistent snapshot roots of the
RBB-Tree are held together in an authenticated
linked list—in fact, we use our own append-only au-
thenticated skip list from Section 5.1.
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Figure 8: A detail from the tree of Figure 7 illustrating
dynamic set persistence. The hollow arrows inside the
RBB nodes denote the different version slots of each
node (up to three in this example). Version 2 is identical
to that of the original tree shown before. Version 3 is
version 2 after key 18 is removed. As a result, a new
key node 15’ is created and, similarly, a new key node
12’ is created. Version 4 is version 3 after key 19 is
inserted. The RBB node previously holding 14 and 15’
had no more room for key nodes, so a new RBB node was
created to hold the new key nodes 14’, 15” and 19. At
the bottom, the snapshot root skip list is shown. Nodes
that change in a snapshot use the skip list authenticator
of the previous snapshot as their NIL value, to preserve
the “freshness” of the snapshot.
Since each snapshot of the RBB-Tree is a “vir-
tual” binary authenticated search tree, the root la-
bel of that tree (i.e., the label of the root key node of
the root RBB node) is a one-way digest of the snap-
shot [6, 7]. Furthermore, the authenticated skip list
of those snapshot root labels is itself a one-way di-
gest of the sequence of snapshot roots. As a result,
the label of the last element of the snapshot root
skip list is a one-way digest of the entire history of
operations of the persistent RBB-Tree. The snap-
shot root skip list subsumes the functionality of the
Time Tree in our earlier persistent authenticated
Red-Black tree design [16].
We piggy-back the disk location of the snapshot
root along with the snapshot root label as the data
value in every skip list element; however only snap-
shot root labels participate in skip list authentica-
tor and link computation, since the particular disk
location of a snapshot root need not be proved to
anyone.
In some cases the “freshness” of an authenticated
dictionary snapshot has to be provable. For ex-
ample, in our description of secure timelines, we
have specified that the system state must depend
on the authenticator of the previous timeline time
step. When the system state is represented by an
authenticated dictionary, an existence proof within
that dictionary need not only show that a sought
element is part of the dictionary given the dictio-
nary digest (root hash), but also that the sought
element was added into the dictionary after the au-
thenticator of the previous time step was known.
As with other authenticated dictionaries, we accom-
plish this by making the hash label of NIL point-
ers equal to the “freshness” authenticator, so that
all existence proofs of newly inserted elements—
equivalently, non-existence proofs of newly removed
elements—prove that they happened after the given
freshness authenticator was known. Note that sub-
trees of the RBB-Tree that do not change across
snapshots retain their old freshness authenticators.
This is acceptable, since freshness is only necessary
to prove to a client that a requested modification
was just performed (for example, when we produce
entanglement receipts in Section 4), and is required
only of newly removed or inserted dictionary ele-
ments.
In standalone RBB-Trees, the freshness authenti-
cator is simply the last authenticator in the snap-
shot root list (i.e., the authenticator that resulted
from the insertion of the latest closed snapshot root
into the skip list). In the RBB-Trees that we use
for thread archives in Timeweave (Section 5.3), the
freshness authenticator is exactly the authenticator
of the previous timeline time step.
5.3 Timeweave
Timeweave is an implementation of the timeline en-
tanglement mechanisms described in Section 4. It is
built using our authenticated append-only skip lists
(Section 5.1) and our on-disk persistent authenti-
cated search trees (Section 5.2).
A Timeweave node maintains four components:
first, a service state, which is application specific,
and the one-way digest mechanism thereof; second,
its secure timeline; third, a persistent authenticated
archive of timeline threads received; and, fourth, a
simple archive of entanglement receipts received.
The archive of timeline threads is also an authen-
ticated dictionary, but persistent in this case. The
data stored in the dictionary are timeline threads
for incoming threads, and timeline thread receipts
for outgoing threads. The data are ordered by the
identity of the remote service in the thread opera-
tion, and then by the foreign logical time associated
with the thread operation. The dictionary is im-
plemented as an RBB-Tree and has a well-defined
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mechanism for calculating its one-way digest, de-
scribed in Section 5.2.
Finally, the timeline itself is stored as an append-
only authenticated skip list. The system digest used
to derive the timeline authenticator at every logical
time step is a hash of the concatenation of the ser-
vice state digest and the digest of the thread archive
after any incoming and outgoing threads have been
recorded.
The main operational loop of a Timeweave ma-
chine is as follows:
1. Handle client requests and update system state
digest f(S).
2. Insert all valid incoming timeline threads into
thread archive E and update thread archive di-
gest g(E).
3. Hash together the digests to produce system
digest d = h(f(S)‖g(E)).
4. Append d into the timeline skip list, resulting
in a new timeline authenticator T , and sign the
authenticator.
5. For all incoming timeline threads just archived,
construct and return receipts to thread senders.
6. If it is time to send an outgoing timeline thread,
send one to all peers, and store the receipts in
the receipt archive.
The Timeweave machine also allows clients to
request local temporal mappings of remote logi-
cal times and temporal precedences between local
times.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance char-
acteristics of timeline entanglement. First, in Sec-
tion 6.1, we present measurements from a Java im-
plementation of the Timeweave infrastructure: au-
thenticated append-only skip lists and RBB-Trees.
Then, in Section 6.2, we explore the performance
characteristics of the system as a function of the two
basic Timeweave system parameters, entanglement
frequency, and entangled service set size.
In all measurements, we use a lightly loaded
dual Pentium III Xeon computer at 1 GHz, with
2 GBytes of main memory, running RedHat Linux
7.2, with the stock 2.4.9-13smp kernel and Sun Mi-
crosystems’ JVM 1.3.02. The three disks used in
the experiments are model MAJ3364MP made by
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Figure 9: Skip list performance. (a) Append time vs.
list size. “Global average” shows average performance
over all operations; “last average” shows performance
during the last 100,000 operations for a given size; and
“no hash” shows the same information as “last average”
but excludes hashing operations. (b) Search time vs. list
size. “Existence” shows searches from a random element
to the end of the list, and “precedence” shows searches
between two random elements.
Fujitsu, which offer 10,000 RPMs and 5 ms aver-
age seek time. We devote 1 GByte of main mem-
ory to each experiment, for in-memory caching and
disk block caching alike. We use a block size of
16 KBytes, which fixes the order of RBB-Trees to
r = 145. Finally, for signing we use DSA with SHA-
1, with a key size of 1024 bits.
6.1 Data Structure Performance
We measure the raw performance characteristics of
our disk-based authenticated data structures. Since
Timeweave relies heavily on these two data struc-
tures, understanding their performance can help
evaluate the performance limitations of Timeweave.
Figure 9(a) shows the performance of skip list ap-
pends, for skip list sizes ranging from 100,000 to
100 million elements, in 100,000 element increments.
The figure graphs average time taken by an append
over all operations alongside append times averaged
over the “last” few operations (100,000 last appends
for each size plotted). Late appends cost marginally
more than the average append operation. The fig-
ure also shows the time taken per append excluding
hash operations. Although more data are hashed
during appends of larger skip lists, the graph shows
that the difference is indistinguishable compared to
the setup time of the Java hashing machinery.
We also measure the performance of skip list
searches, in Figure 9(b). We ran 10,000 random
existence search trials per size and 10,000 random
precedence search trials per size. A random exis-
tence search picks a random element in the list and
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Figure 10: RBB-Tree performance for different snap-
shot sizes. Curve labels indicate the number of keys per
snapshot—from 100 keys to 1 million keys per snapshot.
(a) Insertion time vs. tree size. (b) Search time vs. tree
size.
Keys per snapshot 100 1K 10K 100K 1M
Tree Size (GB) 64 45 24 4 0.5
Table 1: Tree size on disk as a function of the snapshot
size used to build it. Sizes shown correspond to trees
with three million keys.
finds a proof from that element to the end of the
list. A random precedence search picks two random
elements in the list and finds a proof from the earlier
to the later element. Existence searches are cheaper
than precedence searches. This is true because ran-
dom existence proofs for the same list size share,
with high probability, the last few links towards the
end of the list, making better use of cached disk
blocks.
We continue by evaluating the performance char-
acteristics of RBB-Trees. Figure 10 contains two
graphs, one showing how insertion time grows
with tree size (Figure 10(a)) and another show-
ing how search time grows with tree size (Fig-
ure 10(b)). Search experiments consisted of 1,000
random searches for every size increment. In both
cases, we compare trees with different snapshot
sizes, from 100 keys to 1 million keys per snapshot.
Searches are roughly equivalent across all snapshot
sizes, since the “shape” of the tree is independent
of how frequently the authentication labels are com-
puted. However, different snapshot sizes affect the
variance of search performance.
Smaller snapshot sizes result in more disk blocks
stored, because they create more versions of par-
tially full blocks. Table 1 shows the disk size of
a three million key RBB-Tree with varying snap-
shot sizes. This makes shorter-snapshot trees more
expensive during insertion, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 10(a).
Finally, we graph proof sizes in skip lists (Fig-
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Figure 11: Proof sizes (minimum, average, maximum)
in skip lists and RBB-Trees vs. structure size. (a) Proof
size vs. distance between the proof ends of a skip list
proof. (b) Proof size vs. tree size.
ure 11(a)) and RBB-Trees (Figure 11(b)). Both
graphs show proof sizes in KBytes, over 10,000 uni-
form random trials in a skip list of 100 million ele-
ments and an RBB-Tree of three million elements,
respectively. The skip list graph uses the element
distance as the x axis—the distance of elements i
and j is j − i elements. The curve starts out as
a regular square logarithmic curve, except for large
distances, close to the size of the entire list. We con-
jecture that the reason for this exception is that for
random trials of distance close to the entire list size,
all randomly chosen proofs are worst-case proofs,
including every link of every level between source
and destination, although we must explore this ef-
fect further. The RBB-Tree graph shows a regular
logarithmic curve.
6.2 System Performance
Although microbenchmarks can be helpful in un-
derstanding how the basic blocks of Timeweave per-
form, they cannot give a complete picture of how the
system performs in action. For example, very rarely
does a Timeweave machine need to insert thousands
of elements into a skip list back-to-back. As a re-
sult, the disk block caching available to batched in-
sertions is not available for skip list usage patterns
exhibited by Timeweave. Similarly, most searches
through timelines only span short distances; for
one second-long timeline time steps with one en-
tanglement process per peer every 10 minutes, a
Timeweave machine barely needs to traverse a dif-
ference of 10×60 = 600 elements to extract a prece-
dence proof, unlike the random trials measured in
Figure 9.
In this section we measure the performance of
a Timeweave machine in action. Assuming that
the machine uses timeline steps that last one sec-
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Figure 12: Timeweave performance for different thread-
per-step ratios. The errorbars show one standard devia-
tion around the average. (a) Insertion time vs. tree size.
(b) Search time vs. tree size.
ond, we measure the amount of time, per second,
that the machine spends on Timeweave mainte-
nance. Timeweave maintenance consists of the dif-
ferent steps taken to verify, archive and acknowledge
timeline threads. By varying the number of thread
messages arriving at the Timeweave machine per
time step, we simulate the maintenance loads result-
ing from different service set sizes. For example, if
the entangled service set consists of 1200 Timeweave
machines, and they all entangle with each other
once every 600 steps (i.e., once every ten minutes),
then every Timeweave machine sends and receives
two threads per time step. In our experiments, we
combine the receipt message sent by the Timeweave
machine with the next thread message originating
from the same machine. Although the same number
of entanglement processes take place as in the pro-
tocol described in Section 4, some redundant data
transmissions are eliminated.
Figure 12(a) shows the time it takes a single
machine to perform Timeweave maintainance per
second-long time step. The roughly linear rate at
which maintenance processing grows with the ratio
of threads per time step indicates that all-to-all en-
tanglement can scale to large entangled service sets
only by limiting the entanglement frequency. How-
ever, for reasonably large service sets, up to 1000
Timeweave machines for 10-minute entanglement,
maintenance ranges between 2 and 8% of the pro-
cessing resources of a PC-grade server.
Figure 12(b) shows the amount of data sent per
time step from a single Timeweave machine. Al-
though the data rate itself is no cause for con-
cern, the number of different destinations for secure
transmissions could also limit how all-to-all entan-
glement scales. Again, for entangled service sets
and entanglement intervals that do not exceed two
or three threads per time step, Timeweave mainte-
nance should not pose a problem to a low-end server
machine with reasonable connectivity.
7 Conclusion
In this work we seek to extend the traditional idea of
time stamping into the concept of a secure timeline,
a tamper-proof historic record of the states through
which a system passed in its lifetime. Secure time-
lines make it possible to reason about the tempo-
ral ordering of system states in a provable man-
ner. We then proceed to define timeline entangle-
ment, a technique for creating undeniable tempo-
ral orderings across mutually distrustful service do-
mains. Finally, we design, describe the implementa-
tion of, and evaluate Timeweave, a prototype imple-
mentation of our timeline entanglement machinery,
based on two novel authenticated data structures:
append-only authenticated skip lists and disk-based,
persistent authenticated search trees. Our measure-
ments indicate that sizes of a few hundred service
domains can be efficiently entangled at a frequency
of once every ten minutes using Timeweave.
Although our constructs preserve the correctness
of temporal proofs, they are not complete, since
some events in a dishonest service domain can be
hidden from the timelines with which that domain
entangles (Section 4.3). We plan to aleviate this
shortcoming by employing a technique reminiscent
of the signed-messages solution to the traditional
Byzantine Generals problem [15]. Every time ser-
vice A sends a thread to peer B, it also piggybacks
all the signed threads of other services it has re-
ceived and archived since the last time it sent a
thread to B. In such a manner, a service will be able
to verify that all members of the entangled service
set have received the same, unique timeline authen-
ticator from every other service that it has received
and archived, thereby verifying global historic in-
tegrity.
We also hope to migrate away from the all-
to-all entanglement model, by employing recently-
developped, highly scalable overlay architectures
such as CAN [22] and Chord [23]. In this way, a
service only entangles its timeline with its imme-
diate neighbors. Temporal proofs involving non-
neighboring service domains use transitive secure
temporal mapping, over the routing path in the
overlay, perhaps choosing the route of least tem-
poral loss.
Finally, we are working on a large scale dis-
tributed historic file system that enables the auto-
matic maintenance of temporal orderings among file
16
system operations across the entire system.
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